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Abstract 
Following assessments that attacks with radiological and nuclear weapons are possible, 
detection system deployments are being supported at national and local levels. Detection 
systems include both, highly sensitive but non-discriminating detectors, as well as 
detectors and algorithms capable of distinguishing and identifying gamma rays by 
energy. The latter systems, usually handheld systems based on sodium iodide detectors, 
also provide analysis of the specific radionuclides present and are referred to as 
radioisotope identifiers (RIIDs). Studies have shown that sodium iodide based RIIDs fall 
far short of 100% accurate identifications. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) initiated the Regional Reachback (RRB) Program in 2006 to provide rapid expert 
interpretation of gamma spectroscopic data from radiation alarms fiom detection systems 
deployed by state and local authorities. With expert specialists on call 24/7, RRB 
provides an avenue for local and state authorities to verify routine results, interpret 
unlcnown identifications, and notify national response assets if needed. This paper will 
provide details of the RRE3 program, an outline of the analysis process, a description of 
the drills and training systems used to maintain specialists' response performance, and 
examples of drills and incidents from the first full year of operation. 
Introduction 
After the terrorist attacks of September 1 1, 200 1, numerous systems for addressing any 
and all threats were considered. Following assessments that attacks with radiological and 
nuclear weapons were possible, and with extremely dire consequences, it became 
apparent that radiation and nuclear detection systems needed to be deployed at both the 
national and local levels. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the 
U S .  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been tasked with the development of a 
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture that integrates detection systems operating at 
different government levels, including international, domestic, state and local. 
Detection systems include highly sensitive but non-discriminating detectors, used for 
rapid screening applications, as well as detectors and algorithms capable of distinguishing 
and identifying gamma rays by energy. The latter systems, usually handheld systems 
based on sodium iodide detectors, also provide identification of the specific radionuclides 
present and are referred to as radioisotope identifiers (RIIDs). RIIDs are used by police, 
hazmat teams, and other first responders when alarms sound from screening systems 
(drive-through portals or car-mounted systems) or from pagers carried by police officers. 
Studies from 2004 and earlier have shown that sodium iodide based RIIDs are less than 
50% accurate in identifying radioactive sources. Even with these shortcomings, there are 
programs to improve the portal-sized and mobile systems (e.g. the Advanced 
Spectroscopic Portal, ASP) by incorporating RIID technology into these larger detection 
systems. These advances represent a new generation in detection systems, and 
deployment of these newer technologies is forthcoming. To improve RIID identification 
accuracy, advanced handheld systems using higher-energy-resolution lanthanum halide 
detector materials are in production, but the algorithm developments to improve 
identification have not been tested to date. 
As state and local authorities deploy more detection systems, the number of alarms 
needing additional adjudication assistance will also increase. In 2006, DHS initiated the 
Regional Reachback Program (RRE3) to provide rapid expert interpretation of gamma 
spectroscopic data from radiation alarms from state and local authorities. RRB’s 
technical adjudication is complemented by the DNDO Joint Analysis Center (JAC) which 
performs operational adjudication in the form of performing license checks, fusing 
available intelligence, and maintaining situational awareness. Together RRB and the 
JAC comprise the initial reachback layer of DNDO’s alarm adjudication process for state 
and local requests for assistance. With expert specialists on call 24/7, RRB provides an 
avenue for state and local authorities to verify routine results, interpret unknown 
identifications, and enter the national level of reachback that can notify national response 
assets if needed. 
Mission, Components and Communications 
RRl3’s prime mission is to adjudicate alarms by reviewing and interpreting gamma 
spectroscopic data collected at detection sites operated by state and local authorities. 
Two regional teams of scientists and spectroscopists have been assembled from Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory and Savannah River National Laboratory in the Southeast 
(SE), and from Brookhaven National Laboratory and the Environmental Measurements 
Laboratory in the Northeast (NE). On-call teams consist of two scientists for each region, 
who confer during a call after performing individual analyses. Calls will be answered at 
any time, and are made through the JAC, which functions as a fusion node for data 
correlation, transmittal, and analysis in addition to providing operational adjudication. 
[Telephone 877-DNDO-JAC (877-363-3522) or E-Mail DNDO.JAC@,dhs.gov. A secure 
web portal is currently in development.] After initial phone contacts, state and local 
authorities transmit spectral data and incident information via e-mail or, in the future, 
through the secure web portal. The JAC alerts and sends the data to on-call RRB 
specialists, who are expected to provide an analysis within 30 minutes of receiving the 
data. 
Members of the RRB team have experience in gamma spectroscopy and related areas of 
radiation detection technology, and undergo training in threat detection and identification 
focused on radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or improvised nuclear devices (INDs). 
Training includes extensive familiarization with detection systems in use at DHS and at 
state and local facilities, understanding threats and their signatures, and radioactive 
materials used in industry and medicine. Reachback specialists also undergo training in 
the use of three software tools, GADKAS (Gamma Detector Response and Analysis 
Software), Cambio, and PealtEasy, intended specifically for the identification and 
quantification of radioactive materials. These tools were developed at Sandia National 
Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory, respectively, and have been modified 
in recent years to address the larger number of radioisotopes and physical forms to be 
found in naturally occurring and legal applications of radioactive materials. 
RRB specialists maintain their response sltills by participating in weekly drills issued by 
the JAC. Spectroscopic capabilities are honed by preparing and solving sample problems 
at regular .weekly and monthly meetings, quarterly regional meetings, and yearly national 
meetings. Software updates, new products for radiation detection, and new applications 
of radioisotopes are also discussed at these meetings. The two active RRB teams respond 
to calls from all over the nation as assigned by the JAC, and have a regional outreach 
component. In regional outreach, the specialists will meet with local police and state and 
local authorities to explain the reachback program, to encourage response through the 
JAC, and to provide additional training, especially on the data download and transmittal 
procedures. RRB also participates in related homeland security activities. In the NE, a 
regional effort funded by the DHS lcnown as the Securing the Cities (STC) program is 
deploying thousands of radiation detection “pagers” and more than 100 RIID units. NE 
RRB personnel sit on the planning and organizing committees of STC to ensure proper 
coordination. The same is true in the SE, where the SE Transportation Corridor Pilot 
(SETCP) deployed radiation portal monitors and handheld RIIDs at truck weigh stations. 
SE RRB has worked with the SETCP in deployment, training, and exercises. RRB 
specialists often also work within other DNDO assignments and programs across the 
country that support enhancing the radiological and nuclear capabilities of state and local 
responders. 
RRB Response Scenario and Examples 
The process for RRB response begins with notification by state and local responders to 
the JAC of a radiation alarm and response per the state and local protocols. The decision 
to call the JAC generally occurs after the local responders have some data about the 
identity of the radioactive material from a RIID, or radiation portal monitor. Duty 
officers at the JAC collect all information from the local responder, request digital 
spectroscopic data files, and review all the information while contacting the RRB. The 
initial part of the RRB involvement is a conference call between the regional specialists 
and the JAC officer where information about the scenario and spectroscopic data are 
transmitted from the JAC to the specialists. In addition to spectroscopic files from the 
RIID or portal, information such as the distance from the detector to the source and 
possible shielding materials reduce uncertainty in the calculation of the quantity of 
radioactive materials . 
After the two-to-three minute conference call, the specialists may work independently 
while analyzing the data. The spectroscopic files from the detection equipment are 
opened and reviewed in Cambio or PealtEasy. Cambio and PealtEasy have been designed 
to speed the specialist’s access to gamma emission peak libraries, automatic calculations 
of data such as peak centroid, Compton edge, backscatter, peak, sum peak, and single and 
double escape peaks. PeakEasy also offers an option to search for specified gamma 
energy values and list isotopes with energies near that value. At this stage it is customary 
to look for clear spectral signatures for “routine” commercial radioisotopes. In addition, 
the RRB specialist is also scanning for indications of the presence of special nuclear 
material or neutron emissions which could indicate a threat. Special nuclear materials 
(uranium, plutonium, and neptunium) are very closely regulated and should not be seen 
in commercial or private vehicles. Neutron emissions may be reported when neutron 
detectors are in the detection system, but evidence of neutrons may also be present in the 
gamma spectrum if levels are high enough and/or if materials with strong neutron 
interactions, such as plastics, are present with a lower-level source. 
Whether or not a radioisotope is unequivocally identified, the analysis continues with the 
GADRAS program, which has automatic identification schemes. GADRAS is a useful 
tool because, in addition to radionuclide identification, it can calculate what quantity of 
radioactive material is present based on some geometry assumptions and input on 
shielding and distance. GADRAS calculations include the effects of scattering and other 
photoelectron interactions and this requires characterization of the detector geometry and 
response parameters. This is very important as it allows the specialist to perform a 
continuum analysis which brings out information on the shielding, and, more importantly, 
allows the specialist to examine the data for weak signatures of possibly hidden or 
masked nuclides. GADRAS is also able to calculate and plot spectra if radioisotope 
composition and shielding assumptions are inputs to a basic one-dimensional model 
geometry. [Note that GADRAS and PealtEasy are not available to the general public. 
Only employees of or contractors to the U.S. Government may use them.] 
, 
Figure 1 shows a spectrum submitted in February 2008. In this event the police were 
testing new (but not spectroscopic) mobile equipment and requested an explanation as to 
why the helium-3 neutron detector reported the presence of neutrons above background. 
They also wanted to know why the RIID that was being used identified cobalt-57 (57C0) 
when the manifest for the shipment indicated that only cobalt-60 (60Co) was in the 
shipment. The shipper was well known to the police and had a history of similar legal 
exclusive use shipments. This event was similar to one that occurred in September 2007, 
where slightly elevated neutron counts and a wrong identification of ‘OCo were reported 
using a mobile mounted spectroscopic system. 
Two issues raise concerns from these events: elevated neutron counts and isotope 
misidentification. Elevated neutron counts are a concern because commercial uses of 
neutron sources are limited to well-logging and soil moisture-density gages. The threat 
potential of neutron alarms is higher because plutonium emits high levels of neutrons. In 
the earlier alarm, the neutron levels were attributed to variations in instrument 
background readings, a conclusion consistent with RRB experience with that particular 
detector. The neutron issue was resolved after the JAC determined in the second event 
that the shipping casks used for the shipment were constructed with depleted uranium 
shielding. There were three casks with a total weight of 7,000 lb. A review of nuclear 
science sources verified that depleted uranium has a low but measurable neutron emission 
rate, between 0.01 1 and 0.016 n-sec-’g-’. Using the higher rate, 7,000 Ib (or 3,182 kg) 
will emit about 5 x 1 O4 dsec. This quantity, emitted isotropically, is lower than levels 
emitted by commercial sources. It is detectable with the larger detectors found in portals 
or mobile applications if they are brought close enough to the mass of depleted uranium. 
Figure 1. Unknown Spectrum with background subtracted 
The issue about a wrong identification was less complicated. Figwe 2 shows a gamma 
spectrum from a small unshielded ‘OCo source, taken with a similar RIID as the spectrum 
in Figure 1. Note the distinctive double peak pattern, indicating gamma energies at 1 173 
and 1332 IteV, a pattern almost completely obscured in Figure I .  Figure I shows a single 
peak with a centroid at about 1332 lteV, but no indication of a second one. The 
preferential attenuation of lower energy gamma rays by shielding materials is well known 
and was one of the demonstrations in the training sessions for the RRE3 specialists. In 
this particular case, massive amounts of shielding were required to make this source safe 
for shipment, and this large amount of shielding was sufficient to eliminate the signature 
of the 1 173 keV gamma ray from “Co. 
Figure 3 presents a spectrum calculated using GADRAS with the characteristics of the 
specific RIID used by the responders. In this calculated spectrum with 300 curies of “Co 
shielded by about 7 cm of depleted uranium, there is still a vestige of the 1173 lteV peak 
visible. However, the total levels of counts per channel are at least 10 times lower than 
those seen in Figure 1. Additional modeling to estimate more closely the quantities of 
“Co was not carried out because the incident in February 2008 involved three casks on 
the truck. A distributed multi-source geometry like this is not readily modeled with the 
one-dimensional simulation code embedded in GADRAS. In addition, the RRB team has 
not been able to determine why the RIID chose 57C0 using the data shown in Figure 1. 
No strong features in the collected spectrum correspond to the gamma peaks associated 
with 57C0 at 136 lteV and 122 1teV. 
The RRB team interpreted this event as a non-threat because the gamma spectrum was 
consistent with the stated source and because the police, in their contact with the JAC, 
noted that the shipper was a known entity. The reported detection of neutrons was of 
great interest because it verified that the equipment being deployed on mobile platforins 
was highly sensitive to sources that could be a possible threat. More importantly, the 
nature of the call, requesting explanations for unexpected results obtained with the new 
equipment, demonstrated that the local users of the equipment were thinking about the 
results obtained and able to use response resources being made available at the federal 
level. They had familiarization and training not only with the detection systems but with 
the DNDO reachback program as well. The deployment of radiation detection equipment 
will only be successful if the local users understand the capabilities and the limitations of 
that equipment. The federal agencies can only have assurance that these deployments are 
effective in guarding against terrorist threats if the local users contact federal resources 
for alarms obtained outside of scheduled drill and exercise activities. 
Conclusions 
The RRB started operations in late 2006. Since then, the RRB and JAC components of 
the DNDO nuclear detection architecture have deinonstrated responsive expert assistaiice 
to state and local police department radiation detection alarms across the country. The 
technology of detection and the applications of isotopes continue to evolve, and RRB is 
committed to monitor the evolutioii to fulfill its mission as experts in radiation detection 
alarm response. 
